Transgressions and expressions: Affective facial muscle activity predicts moral judgments by Cannon, Peter R et al.
Transgressions and Expressions:
Affective Facial Muscle Activity
Predicts Moral Judgments
Peter Robert Cannon1, Simone Schnall1, and Mathew White2
Abstract
Recent investigations into morality suggest that affective responses may precede moral judgments. The present study
investigated, first, whether individuals show specific facial affect in response to moral behaviors and, second, whether the
intensity of facial affect predicts subsequent moral judgments. Muscle activity relating to disgust (levator labii), anger
(corrugator supercilii), and positive affect (zygomaticus major) was recorded while participants considered third-person state-
ments describing good and bad behaviors across five foundations of morality (purity, fairness, harm, authority, and ingroup).
Facial disgust was highest in response to purity violations, followed by fairness violations. In contrast, harm violations evoked
anger expressions. Importantly, the extremity of subsequent moral judgments was predicted by facial affect, such that judg-
ments about purity and fairness correlated with facial disgust, harm correlated with facial anger, and ingroup correlated with
positive facial affect. These results demonstrate that individuals spontaneously exhibit domain-specific moral affect that allows
inferences about their moral judgments.
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Witnessing a moral transgression can evoke strong emotions:
One might feel disgusted with someone cheating in a game
of cards or angry at a person throwing a rock at a dog. Yet the
exact involvement of emotion in moral judgment remains
unclear (see Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009) and indeed has
been a topic of debate for centuries. Immanuel Kant (1788/
1997), for instance, saw little role for emotions in judgments
of morality, which he believed were instead largely the product
of pure reasoning. This rationalist view of morality was later
adopted by many psychologists studying moral development
in children (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983).
On the other hand, sentimentalist philosophers such as David
Hume (1751) have argued that moral judgments are driven
by the emotional response elicited by a moral stimulus (for a
contemporary review of this approach, see Prinz, 2007). This
approach has been further developed in contemporary psycho-
logical theories such as Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist
model, which suggests that intuitions and emotional responses
often precede and guide moral judgments.
Support for the link between emotions and morality has
been provided by studies that induced specific affective states
and then examined how these states influenced subsequent
moral judgments. For example, when feeling physically dis-
gusted, participants often make more severe moral judgments
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt,
2005). Similarly, individuals who are highly sensitive to
disgust are more likely to endorse a guilty verdict in a mock
trial (Jones & Fitness, 2009) and respond less favorably to the
concept of homosexuality (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom,
2009). Moreover, cleansing behaviors performed following a
disgust induction reduce the severity of moral judgments
(Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). However, although these
studies demonstrate that inducing an affective state can influ-
ence moral judgments, they do not examine spontaneous affec-
tive responses to immoral behaviors. The present study
addresses this gap in the literature.
One method of directly assessing an individual’s affective
state as it unfolds in response to a specific stimulus is to
measure facial muscle activity using electromyography. This
technique provides a direct measure of muscle activity by mea-
suring electrical activity on the surface of the skin, which cor-
responds to the amount of muscle activation: Greater muscle
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activation results in higher amplitude recordings, whereas
muscle relaxation results in lower amplitude recordings (see
Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). Using this approach, Chapman,
Kim, Susskind, and Anderson (2009) demonstrated that the
levator labii muscle, which is responsible for raising the upper
lip in disgust expressions, was more active as offers became
more unfair in the Ultimatum Game. This muscle activity also
correlated with participants’ ratings of how disgusted—but not
how angry—they felt about these offers. Fairness is clearly one
important aspect, yet morality represents a broad range of con-
cerns that go beyond fairness alone.
Five such concerns are proposed by moral foundations the-
ory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007).
These include the two most frequently studied moral founda-
tions of ensuring fairness and preventing harm. Furthermore,
studies that demonstrate the relationship between disgust and
moral judgments suggest that individuals desire to protect the
purity of their body and spirit by condemning actions associ-
ated with physical contamination. In addition, individuals
attempt to protect the rights of their social group (ingroup) and
maintain order within society (authority).
The specific objectives of the present study were to investi-
gate whether behaviors relating to the five moral foundations
spontaneously evoked facial muscle activity and, furthermore,
whether such activity would predict subsequent moral judg-
ments. One possible outcome might be that transgressions of all
five of these foundations would result in the same affective
response. If this were the case, then we might expect to see the
same disgust expression that Chapman and colleagues (2009)
identified in their investigation of fairness generalizing to
violations of all five foundations. Alternatively, different cate-
gories of moral transgression may evoke differential affective
responses because specific moral concerns are based on
specific emotional intuitions. For example, physical disgust is
considered to have evolved to protect from possible contamina-
tion or illness from harmful substances such as spoiled food
(Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Sociomoral disgust may
be the result of the physical disgust response extending to
social contexts such that people find situations disgusting in
which moral standards are violated. Thus, disgust is a reaction
to offensive objects as well as offensive actions. Chapman
et al.’s finding that fairness violations relating to the sharing
of resources elicited facial disgust may be the result of socio-
moral disgust. This effect may or may not generalize to a wider
range of fairness transgressions such as cheating, discrimina-
tion, and stealing. In contrast, moral anger or outrage often
occurs simultaneously with sociomoral disgust but is a distinct
emotional response that can be elicited specifically by immoral
behaviors that result in harm (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla,
2007). Similarly, self-rated anger, but not disgust, has been
shown to predict moral judgments of vignettes containing jus-
tice violations (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009).
Thus, facial anger, but not disgust, may be elicited when think-
ing about behaviors that harm others. Based on these previous
findings, we predicted that there would be specific associations
between different emotions and different moral concerns.
Because a range of affective responses were of interest, the
activity of three muscles was recorded while participants were
thinking about moral behaviors. These muscles related to pos-
itive affect (zygomaticus major) and two types of negative
affect: disgust (levator labii) and anger (corrugator supercilii).1
The present investigation used corrugator activity as a measure
of anger because brow knitting associated with corrugator
activity forms part of the universally recognized anger facial
expression (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) and anger-
related stimuli have previously been demonstrated to elicit
corrugator activity (e.g., Cannon, Hayes, & Tipper, 2009;
Dimberg & Karlsson, 1998). Because the corrugator muscle
can also respond to disgusting stimuli (e.g., Vrana, 1993), we
use a specific pattern of facial activity to differentiate between
these two emotional states. For disgust responses we anticipate
greater levator activity relative to corrugator activity, whereas
for anger we anticipate the reverse. Indeed, the primacy of leva-
tor activity for disgust and corrugator for anger has previously
been demonstrated when reading emotional sentences (Vrana,
1993) and emotion-relevant words (Niedenthal, Winkielman,
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009).
Although previous studies have proposed that moral judg-
ments are associated primarily with disgust (e.g., Chapman
et al., 2009), we made specific predictions about the link
between different emotions and morality. Facial disgust was
expected to be elicited by violations of purity and fairness,
whereas anger was expected to be elicited by behaviors that
harm others. Not only was negative affective muscle activity
expected to be higher in response to moral transgressions, but
also a highly specific relationship between muscle activity and
judgments was anticipated: Purity and fairness were expected
to evoke greater disgust facial activity, and in addition this
activity was expected to predict the severity of subsequent
moral judgments about these behaviors. In contrast, facial
anger should predict the severity of judgments about harm.
We made no specific predictions about facial responses to
behaviors relating to ingroup or authority.
Method
A total of 39 members of the University of Plymouth commu-
nity panel (23 female) with a mean age of 27.20 years (SD ¼
10.54) volunteered and were paid £6. Participants’ ethnicity
was predominantly White British.
Procedure
Participants were given the cover story that the study involved
measuring frontal brain activity using electrodes placed on
their forehead while they listened to recorded statements about
other people. The computer-based experiment was divided into
two blocks separated by a short break. In the first block, parti-
cipants listened to 90 statements about positive and negative
moral behaviors presented in a randomized order. After each
statement, a slide was presented for 4 s that instructed, ‘‘Please
think about this behavior.’’ In this first block, facial muscle
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activity was recorded while participants were considering these
behaviors. In the second block, these statements were repeated
in a different order. After hearing each statement, participants
provided a moral judgment using a slide that asked, ‘‘How neg-
ative or positive was this behavior?’’ accompanied by a 7 point
scale, labeled from –3 (very negative) toþ3 (very positive). For
both blocks, trials were preceded by a fixation cross for 2 s. At
the end of each trial, there was a 250 ms blank screen, followed
by the instruction ‘‘Please Wait’’ for 2 s between trials. It is
important to note that during the first block, participants were
not aware that they would be asked to make judgments in the
second block.
Following the computer task, participants were debriefed
using a funneling procedure to ascertain whether they had
guessed the nature of the experiment. Only one participant
guessed the purpose of the recording equipment, and her data
were excluded from analysis.
Stimuli
Covering a broad range of both positive and negative behaviors,
90 statements about other peoples’ behavior were presented to
the participant.2 These were based on a set developed to specif-
ically investigate the moral foundations (Ranganath & Graham,
2010), and some items were slightly modified from American
English to conform to British English. Statements covered the
five moral foundations: purity (e.g., ‘‘Someone meditates to
keep her mind free of impure thoughts’’; ‘‘Someone eats in the
same place she goes to the bathroom’’), fairness (e.g., ‘‘Someone
demonstrated in a civil rights rally’’; ‘‘Someone cheated in a
game of cards’’), harm (e.g., ‘‘Someone showed compassion to
those in need’’; ‘‘Someone pinched a baby’s nose until it cried’’),
authority (e.g., ‘‘Someone gave his seat on the bus to an elderly
person’’; ‘‘Someone was disobedient to all authority figures’’),
and ingroup (e.g., ‘‘Someone skipped lunch to work on a team
project’’; ‘‘Someone gossiped about a friend at work’’).3
Electromyographic Analyses
Electromyographic data were collected using a Contact
Precision Instruments amplifier sampling at 4 KHz. Data were
rectified, downsampled to 100 Hz, filtered using a high pass
filter at 30 Hz, a low pass filter at 1 KHz, and a notch filter
at 50 Hz, log10 corrected, and then standardized across parti-
cipants and muscle sites. Mean muscle activity for the 500 ms
period prior to each trial was subtracted from the activity level
during the 4 s period following stimulus offset, resulting in a
change score that controlled for tonic muscle activity. Activity
was recorded using 4 mm unshielded Ag/AgCl electrodes filled
with electrolyte gel. Preparation was consistent with Fridlund
and Cacioppo’s (1986) guidelines. The four recording sites
were the inside brow (corrugator supercilii: knits brow when
frowning), cheek (zygomaticus major: pulls up corner of mouth
when smiling), nose (levator labii: raises top lip during facial
disgust expression), and forehead (medial frontalis: not reported
because of a hardware fault on this channel). Using blind-coded
videos of the participants’ faces recorded during the experiment,
9.5% of trials were excluded before analysis because of face or
body movement during the baseline period.
Results
Moral Judgments About Good and Bad Behaviors
Moral judgment data from Block 2 were entered into a 5 (foun-
dations: purity, harm, fairness, authority, ingroup) 2 (valence:
good, bad) repeated-measures analysis of variance.4
This revealed significant main effects of foundation, F(4, 144)
¼ 29.54, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .02, valence, F(1, 36) ¼ 863.74,
p < .001, Z2¼ .83, and a significant interaction between founda-
tion and valence, F(4, 144)¼ 55.30, p < .001, Z2¼ .06. Planned
repeated contrasts were conducted comparing the difference
between foundations for each valence. For bad behaviors, judg-
ments about each foundation were ordered frommost negative to
least negative. In order of severity of moral judgments, harm vio-
lations (M ¼ –2.39) were rated as the most negative, followed
by fairness (Mdiff ¼ –0.36, p < .001), purity (Mdiff ¼ –0.39,
p ¼ .007), authority (Mdiff ¼ –0.41, p ¼ .002), and then
ingroup (Mdiff ¼ –0.23 p ¼ .04). Good behaviors were ordered
from most positive to least positive. Positive harm foundation
behaviors (M ¼ 2.37) were rated more positive than fairness
(Mdiff ¼ 0.52, p < .001), which was judged to be more positive
than authority (Mdiff ¼ 0.35, p ¼ .01), which was judged to be
equal to ingroup (Mdiff ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .75), although ingroup was
more positive than purity (Mdiff ¼ 0.59, p < .001).
As a manipulation check, planned t tests were conducted
that assessed whether means for good and bad behaviors for
each foundation were significantly different from the midpoint
on the scale. These revealed that bad behaviors for all five
foundations were rated significantly more negative than the
midpoint of the rating scale (all ps < .001, all ds > 3.4) and that
all good behaviors were rated significantly more positive than
the midpoint of the scale (all ps < .001, all ds > 2.2). These
moral judgments are shown in Figure 1.
Muscle Activity
Electromyographic data were analyzed using 5 (foundations:
purity, harm, fairness, authority, ingroup)  2 (valence: good,
bad) repeated-measures analyses of variance.5 Different pre-
dictions were made about the levator, corrugator, and zygoma-
ticus muscles, so data for each were analyzed separately. The
purpose of these analyses was to determine whether moral and
immoral behaviors relating to the five moral foundations would
elicit differential facial muscle activity.
For the levator muscle there was a significant interaction
between foundation and valence, F(4, 148) ¼ 5.41, p < .001,
Z2 ¼ .05. Entering the foundation factor into a separate analysis
of variance for each valence revealed that there was a significant
difference within the five foundations for bad behaviors, F(4,
148) ¼ 6.57, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .15, but not for good behaviors,
F(4, 148) ¼ 0.80, p ¼ .53, Z2 ¼ .02.6 This predicted effect was
analyzed further using planned two-tailed one-sample t tests to
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compare whether muscle activity during the thinking period was
significantly higher than the baseline level of muscle activity
immediately before listening to these behaviors. As predicted,
purity violations resulted in the greatest increase in levator activ-
ity, t(37) ¼ 3.68, p ¼ .001, d ¼ 1.2, followed by fairness viola-
tions, t(37) ¼ 3.13, p ¼ .003, d ¼ 1.0. There was also a
marginal increase in activity to harm violations, t(37) ¼ 1.87,
p ¼ .07, d ¼ 0.61, but no significant increase in activity in
response to ingroup or authority violations (both p > .16).
The corrugator muscle also showed a significant interaction
between foundation and valence, F(4, 148)¼ 4.75, p < .001, Z2
¼ .05. Analyzing each valence separately revealed that there
was a significant effect of foundation for both bad behaviors,
F(4, 148) ¼ 3.32, p ¼ .01, Z2 ¼ .08, and good behaviors,
F(4, 148) ¼ 2.90, p ¼ .02, Z2 ¼ .07. Because corrugator
activity was predicted to be evoked by violations of the harm
foundation, this effect was assessed using a one-sample t test
versus the baseline level of activity. Indeed, when thinking
about bad behaviors in the harm foundation, there was a
significant increase in corrugator muscle activity, t(37) ¼ 2.40,
p¼ .02, d¼ 0.79. Therewas no significant increase in corrugator
activity to violations of the purity, fairness, ingroup, or authority
–0.10
–0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
Purity Fairness Harm Authority Ingroup
Le
va
to
r C
ha
ng
es
co
re
 
–0.10
–0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
Purity Fairness Harm Authority Ingroup
Zy
go
m
at
ic
us
 C
ha
ng
es
co
re
 
–0.10
–0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
Purity Fairness Harm Authority Ingroup
C
or
ru
ga
to
r C
ha
ng
es
co
re
 
–3.00
–2.00
–1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
Purity Fairness Harm Authority Ingroup
R
at
in
g
“very positive” 
“very negative”
Levator Activity Corrugator Activity
Moral Judgments  Zygomaticus Activity
Bad Behaviors
Good Behaviors
Figure 1. Average muscle activity and moral judgments for behaviors covering the five moral foundations
Note: Muscle activity was recorded during the 4 s following exposure to stimuli in Block 1 while participants were instructed ‘‘Please think about this behavior.’’
For each statement, a change score was calculated by subtracting the average muscle activity from the 500 ms period immediately before listening to the behavior
from the muscle activity while thinking about the same behavior. Moral judgments were collected in Block 2 following a second exposure to each behavior. Error
bars represent standard errors.
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foundations (allps> .20).Because there alsowas a significant dif-
ference in activity across the five foundations while thinking
about good behaviors, this unpredicted effect was investigated
using t tests. Thinking about good behaviors involving purity
significantly reduced the level of corrugator muscle activation,
t(37) ¼ –2.52, p ¼ .02, d ¼ 0.83; no other differences were
significant (all ps > .21).
Finally, the zygomaticus muscle did not show a significant
interaction between foundation and valence, F(4, 148) ¼ 1.73,
p ¼ .15, Z2 ¼ .02. Unlike the corrugator and levator muscles,
neither purity (p ¼ .15, d ¼ 0.48), nor harm (p ¼ .30, d ¼
0.34), nor fairness (p ¼ .15, d ¼ 0.49) violations evoked
increased zygomaticus response.
Relationship Between Moral Judgments and Muscle
Activity
The previous set of analyses revealed specific patterns of mus-
cle activity in response to positive and negative behaviors
within the five moral foundations. To test whether facial affect
in response to moral and immoral behaviors predicts subse-
quent moral condemnation, facial muscle activity recorded
in Block 1 was correlated with the moral judgment for that
same behavior in Block 2.7 These analyses were conducted
at an item level to determine whether muscle activity for dif-
ferent moral behaviors predicted the extremity of subsequent
moral judgments. Item-level data are preferable to
participant-level data in these analyses because they can
describe whether behaviors that are judged to be more severe
moral violations also evoke greater muscle activity. The rela-
tionship between muscle activity and moral judgments for the
five foundations is shown in Table 1.
Overall, muscle activity was negatively correlated with
moral judgments such that more negative items tended to elicit
higher muscle activity. This pattern was significant for both the
levator, r(88)¼ –.23, p¼ .04, and the corrugator, r(88)¼ –.30,
p ¼ .005, but not the zygomaticus, r(88) ¼ –.12, p ¼ .26.
Owing to the foundation-specific hypotheses about this
relationship, separate correlations were calculated for each of
the five foundations. Table 1 shows that, as expected, levator
muscle activity predicted the extremity of moral judgments for
purity and fairness, but this was not the case for harm, ingroup,
or authority. In this relationship, increased levator activity pre-
dicted more severe moral judgments and decreased levator
activity predicted more positive moral judgments. Similarly,
corrugator muscle activity predicted the extremity of moral
judgments for harm foundation items. There were also several
unpredicted effects. Corrugator activity was correlated with
extremity of moral judgments for purity. Because of the sever-
ity of the disgust response to purity violations, it is likely that
the corrugator muscle was also recruited in response to these
behaviors, forming a full face disgust expression. Supporting
this possibility, controlling for levator activity using a partial
correlation resulted in a nonsignificant relationship between
corrugator muscle activity and moral judgments, rp(15) ¼ –.21,
p¼ .41. In contrast, controlling for levator activity did not change
the relationship between corrugator activity andmoral judgments
for harm behaviors, rp(15) ¼ –.60, p ¼ .01.
Although there were no foundation-specific predictions for
the zygomaticus muscle, analyses revealed that for the purity
foundation, increased activity was related to more negative
judgments. This effect can be explained by addressing the rela-
tionship between the levator and zygomaticus muscles. Collap-
sing across foundation and valence and analyzing the
relationship between these two muscles throughout the entire
experiment revealed that there was high covariance between
these muscles, r(89) ¼ .59, p < .001. To account for this covar-
iance, the relationship between zygomaticus activity and purity
moral judgments was reanalyzed while controlling for levator
activity; doing so eliminated the correlation between zygoma-
ticus activity and ratings for purity, rp(15) ¼ .03, p ¼ .90. It is
likely that the original zero-order correlation was influenced by
cross talk between these two muscle sites as a result of the close
proximity between these recording sites, as previously docu-
mented by Hoefling et al. (2009).
One final unanticipated finding was that increased
zygomaticus activity was positively correlated with judgments
of ingroup behaviors. Because of the involvement of the
zygomaticus in smiling, this finding suggests that participants
experienced increased positive affect while thinking about
situations involving loyal compared to disloyal behavior.
Discussion
When considering another person behaving in a way that vio-
lates accepted moral standards, individuals spontaneously
express different facial expressions depending on the type of
violation that is committed. As predicted, transgressions that
involved the risk of contamination of the body or spirit resulted
in a strong facial expression of disgust involving the levator
muscle. Disgust was also exhibited during fairness violations,
such as cheating, stealing, and discriminating against others.
The presence of a disgust response to purity and fairness trans-
gressions is predicted by models of sociomoral disgust (e.g.,
Rozin et al., 2008), suggesting that these two moral categories
are closely related. In contrast, when participants considered
transgressions that involved harming others they formed a
Table 1. The Relationship Between Muscle Activity Evoked While
Thinking About Behaviors From the Five Moral Foundations in Block
1 and the Moral Judgments of These Same Behaviors in Block 2
Moral foundation
Purity Fairness Harm Authority Ingroup
Levator –.72*** –.45* .02 .25 .21
Corrugator –.56** –.05 –.59** .07 .01
Zygomaticus –.45* –.31 –.22 .12 .42*
n 18 17 18 18 17
Note: A negative correlation reflects higher muscle activity for more negative
judgments.
* p < .05, one tailed. ** p < .01, one tailed. *** p < .001, one tailed.
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frown that we interpret to be part of an anger expression, with-
out the involvement of moral disgust. No disgust or anger
responses occurred to transgressions committed against one’s
social group or against authority.
A second set of analyses examined the relationship between
muscle activity while thinking about these behaviors the first
time that they were encountered and the later subjective moral
judgments about these behaviors. Overall, there was a relation-
ship between both levator and corrugator muscle activity and
moral judgments, with increased muscle activity while thinking
about bad behaviors and relaxation of these muscles when
thinking about good behaviors. However, this relationship
again depended on the type of behavior under consideration,
with facial disgust correlating with moral judgments about
purity and fairness, frowning correlating with moral judgments
about harm, and positive facial affect correlating with ingroup
behaviors. Critically, these effects occurred without partici-
pants being aware that their facial muscle activity was being
recorded or that they would subsequently be asked to make
moral judgments about these behaviors. The additional finding
that zygomaticus activity also predicted purity violations was
likely the result of cross-talk activity with the levator muscle
in extreme disgust facial expressions (e.g., Hoefling et al.,
2009; Vrana, 1993); however, an alternative possibility that
warrants further investigation is that participants may have
found some of the more extreme purity behaviors amusing as
well as disgusting (see McGraw & Warren, 2010).
Although our study replicates the finding that disgust
expressions are evoked by fairness violations (Chapman
et al., 2009), we find that this is not a universal response to all
moral violations. Previous studies have demonstrated that per-
ceiving an intention to cause harm can evoke increased anger
judgments (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Rozin, Lowery,
Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Our data build on these previous find-
ings by demonstrating that facial anger can be spontaneously
evoked while merely thinking about behaviors that cause harm.
In these situations the magnitude of the anger response was
greater than the disgust response, supporting our claim that
emotions beyond disgust contribute to moral decisions.
One finding worthy of discussion is that authority and ingroup
transgressions did not evoke strong negative affective responses.
This finding might be explained by dual process models of mor-
ality that propose that both conscious reasoning and affective
responses guide moral judgments (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002).
The present data suggest that although spontaneous facial affect
generally predicted the extremity of moral judgments, in some
domains the precise relationship depended on a complex inter-
play of different facial muscles and moral concerns. Thus, some
moral transgressions might be more likely than others to evoke
affective responses, and for those that do not, namely concerns
related to ingroup and authority, additional cognitive, controlled
processes might be recruited to arrive at a moral judgment.
In conclusion, the present study provides the first evidence
of affective facial muscle activity in response to a broad range
of moral concerns. In general, our findings support feeling-
based approaches to moral judgment, such as the social
intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), by demonstrating that when
people consider moral situations, facial affect and moral judg-
ment go hand in hand. Not only do individuals form disgust
and anger facial expressions in response to certain immoral
behaviors, but also the amount of facial muscle activity eli-
cited predicts how severe they perceive these violations to
be. Thus, specific facial affect could serve as an implicit indi-
cator of the moral concerns on which individuals base their
objections to real-world moral dilemmas. This may in turn
guide policy decisions with regard to the handling of sensitive
ethical issues, such as stem-cell research, assisted reproduc-
tion, and cognition-enhancing drugs.
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Notes
1. An advantage of using electromyography is that it can measure
nonvisible activity from the muscles that form facial expressions.
For this reason, when we refer to facial expressions (such as smil-
ing and frowning) we are actually referring to specific muscle
activity that forms part of these expressions.
2. Data for two statements were treated as outliers: One statement
from the fairness category was excluded from analysis because
of a mispronunciation in the recording of this statement; indeed,
data for that statement differed substantially from data of all other
fairness items. One item from the ingroup category was excluded
because it evoked unusual facial muscle activity that was inconsis-
tent with all other items within this category.
3. See online supplementary material at http://spp.sagepub.com/
supplemental.
4. Judgment data were unavailable for one participant because of a
data recording malfunction.
5. Participant sex did not interact with the foundation and valence fac-
tors (all muscles, p > .12) and was not included in subsequent
analyses.
6. For completeness, these t tests were also computed for good beha-
viors. The only significant increase in levator activity was for harm
foundation behaviors, t(37) ¼ 3.75, p ¼ .001, although this activity
was not significantly different from the levator response for bad
harm foundation behaviors (p ¼ .84).
7. These analyses represent Pearson product–moment correlation
coefficients calculated using the mean values of muscle activity
and moral judgments. The identical pattern of results (including
both relative magnitude of the correlation coefficients and pattern
of statistically significant effects) was replicated using Spearman’s
rank order correlation coefficients; these were calculated using the
rank position of muscle activity and moral judgment, as used by
Chapman, Kim, Susskind, and Anderson (2009).
330 Social Psychological and Personality Science 2(3)
 at Society for Personality and Social Psychology on October 19, 2011spp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
References
Cannon, P. R., Hayes, A. E., & Tipper, S. P. (2009). An electromyo-
graphic investigation of the impact of task relevance on facial
mimicry. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 918-929.
Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K.
(2009). In bad taste: Evidence for the oral origins for moral disgust.
Science, 27, 1222-1226.
Dimberg, U., & Karlsson, B. (1998). Facial reactions to different emo-
tionally relevant stimuli. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38,
297-303.
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural ele-
ments in facial display of emotions. Science, 164, 86-88.
Fridlund, A. J., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Guidelines for human elec-
tromyographic research. Psychophysiology, 23, 567-589.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009). Liberals and conservatives
use different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 96, 1029-1046.
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment
work? Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, 517-523.
Gutierrez, R., & Giner-Sorolla, R. S. (2007). Anger, disgust, and pre-
sumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors. Emo-
tion, 7, 853-868.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intui-
tionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108,
814-834.
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Con-
servatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize.
Social Justice Research, 20, 98-116.
Hoefling, A., Likowski, K. U., Deutsch, R., Hafner, M., Seibt, B.,
Muhlberger, A., . . . & Strack, F. (2009). When hunger finds no
fault with moldy corn: Food deprivation reduces food-related dis-
gust. Emotion, 9, 50-58.
Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., Keltner, D., & Cohen, A. B. (2009). Disgust
and the moralization of purity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 97, 963-976.
Huebner, B., Dwyer, S., & Hauser, M. D. (2009). The role of emotion
in moral psychology. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13, 1-6.
Hume, D. (1751). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals.
London, UK: A. Millar.
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009). Disgust
sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays. Emotion, 9,
435-439.
Jones, A., & Fitness, J. (2009). Moral hypervigilance: The influence of
disgust sensitivity in the moral domain. Emotion, 8, 613-627.
Kant, I. (1997). A critique of practical reason (M. Gregor, Trans.).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work pub-
lished 1788).
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-
developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.),
Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347-480). Chi-
cago, IL: Rand McNally.
McGraw, A. P., & Warren, C. (2010). Benign violations: Making
immoral behavior funny. Psychological Science, 21, 1141-1149.
Niedenthal, P. M., Winkielman, P., Mondillon, L., & Vermeulen, N.
(2009). Embodied emotion concepts. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 96, 1120-1136.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. London, UK:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
Prinz, J. J. (2007). The emotional construction of morals. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Ranganath, K. A., & Graham, J. (2010). Implicit attitude formation
based on moral information. Manuscript in preparation.
Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. R. (2008). Disgust. In M. Lewis,
J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of emo-
tions (pp. 757-776). 3rd ed. New York, NY: Guilford.
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The moral-
emotion triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions
(contempt, anger, disgust) and threemoral ethics (community, auton-
omy, divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,
574-586.
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean conscience:
Cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments. Psychologi-
cal Science, 19, 1219-1222.
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as
embodied moral judgment. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 34, 1096-1109.
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and
convention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Vrana, S. R. (1993). The psychophysiology of disgust: Differentiating
negative emotional contexts with facial EMG. Psychophysiology,
30, 279-286.
Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotic disgust makes moral judg-
ments more severe. Psychological Science, 16, 780-784.
Bios
Peter Robert Cannon received his PhD in Psychology from Bangor
University and has continued his postdoctoral research at University
of Plymouth, University of Cambridge, and University of Exeter.
He investigates the relationship between sensorimotor processes,
affective responses, and judgment using a range of psychophysiologi-
cal methods.
Simone Schnall is a university lecturer in the Department of Social
and Developmental Psychology at the University of Cambridge. She
studies the relationship between cognitive and affective processes.
In particular, she is interested in how embodiment informs and con-
strains thought and feeling. Dr Schnall received her PhD in Social
Psychology from Clark University.
Mathew White is a lecturer in Applied Social Psychology at the
University of Plymouth. He received his PhD from the University of
Sheffield and is interested in how people allocate their time to opti-
mise well-being.
Cannon et al. 331
 at Society for Personality and Social Psychology on October 19, 2011spp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
